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ABSTRACT
 
Composition researoh is still a relatively new field.
 
Therefore, composition instructors have often relied on the
 
assumptions found in related disciplines. But it is possible
 
that many of those assumptions work against the essential
 
elements of composition instruction. In particular,
 
composition instructors have turned to literary criticism
 
when they sought theories, principals, and direction. So,
 
it is imperative to understand the ways various ideas of
 
literary criticism can affect the composition classroom.
 
Further, it is imperative to understand that there are
 
other fields of research that can offer insight for
 
composition instructors and their students. One such piece
 
of research comes from the language and philosophy studies
 
of Donald Davidson. His explanation of "passing theory"
 
yields a remarkable parallel to beliefs about the actual
 
process of composing. In addition, his theory presupposes
 
meaning while literary criticism often poses such difficult
 
questions to meaning as to render meaning-meaningless.
 
If composition instructors are to ask students to write
 
and re-write, then their reasons for asking must be built on
 
assumptions that will support the request. Otherwise
 
students may come to doubt the validity of revision, and
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from there they may come to doubt their own ability to
 
understand or be understood.
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CHAPTER I
 
Student Writers and Meaning
 
Studies in Gomposition are centered in meaning, but : :
 
given the fact that composition has only recently been
 
studied as a discipline of its own, teachers of compositioh
 
have not always gone sure-footed over a bedrock of previous
 
research in meaning' as it pertains: tp- writingv Many ways of
 
thinking about meanihg have been borrowed from other
 
disciplines. While some of these ways may be well suited
 
for use in the composition classroom, others may leave the
 
basic student writer permanently confused, and
 
understandab1y so, since at one time or another, meaning has
 
been placed in the hands of the writer, the reader, or the
 
text itself. Studies in literary criticism have even gone
 
beyond these obvious connections to place meaning in the
 
political and environmental surroundings of writer or
 
reader, or in the psychological make-up of writer or reader;
 
or when frustrated, scholars and literary critics have
 
simply denied meaning altogether. They have said meaning is
 
too relative to ever be determined and that individuals can
 
know nothing apart from their own experience or conceptual
 
scheme (our own categories and ways of organizing
 
information). But wherever it exists (and if), meaning is
 
what writers hope will be the product of their labor to be
 
understood, and to be understood is a basic and unavoidable
 
human need. We anxiously ask, "Do you know what I mean?"
 
But given our difficulty in defining meaning and our
 
relativistic challenges to its nature, it is possible that
 
the answer to our question must be, "How could I?"
 
But where would this leave the student writer
 
attempting to answer a margin note of "What do you mean
 
here?" It is safe to assume that since being understood is
 
a human need and human needs have remedies, for example, air
 
for our need to breathe, food for our hunger, water for our
 
thirst, and rest for our weariness, that there is also a
 
remedy for our need to be understood. In many composition
 
classrooms students are taught that the remedy lies in
 
rhetorical strategy. Erica Lindemann, in A Rhetoric for
 
Writing Teachers, says that we teach "rhetoric to develop
 
strategies for creating an effect in our audience (37).
 
This clearly suggests that the writer can orchestrate the
 
reader's response. The writer can "create" predetermined
 
results through careful use of rhetorical strategy.
 
Moreover, according to Lundsford and Edes, in their essay
 
"On Distinctions between Classical and Modern Rhetoric,"
 
"...rhetoric provides the means through which we may both
 
achieve identification with an other and understand that
 
identification through the attribution of motives" (46).
 
Rhetoric holds that language is power and that those well
 
versed in the use of language will advance toward whatever
 
goal they desire, whether noble or not. Fortunately for
 
some, rhetoric is no longer bound to the Platonic idea of
 
ethics beyond the user's. But as writing instructors ours
 
is not to judge the writer's intended meaning but to help
 
the writer in bringing it to fruition. Few methods seem to
 
offer as much help in this goal as rhetorical strategy which
 
empowers writers, gives them reason to perfect their skill,
 
and provides a method by which to be understood.
 
But in other composition classrooms the power of
 
rhetorical strategy is diminished by the belief that meaning
 
resides in the reader, suggesting that, like beauty, meaning
 
is in the eye of the beholder. As Stanley Fish observes,
 
"The shape of belief...is responsible for the shape of
 
interpretation" (As in Dasenbrock 8). In this view reading
 
breathes life into the words and with its breath makes the
 
words its own. Meaning is like the colors in a child's
 
"paint with water" book. Even though color was placed in
 
the picture by the manufacturer, it cannot be seen until the
 
purchaser of the book adds water. And as we know from
 
science it is quite possible that no two people "see" color
 
in the same way, so the manufacturer can only assume the
 
shades seen by the purchaser. And so too the writer merely
 
placed the words on the page, and whatever he or she
 
originally meant (or thought :that they meant) by that
 
action, cannot be known without the reader. The writer's
 
intent and hope to be understood are disregarded, thereby
 
posing a serious threat to rhetorical strategy as remedy,
 
since the writer can only hope that the reader sees it the
 
way the writer intended.
 
The belief that meaning is found in the reader is known
 
as reader response. Reader response began as a theory in
 
literary criticism, and it is only one of many literary
 
approaches to meaning that can challenge the writer's
 
ability to be understood. Literary criticism branches out
 
in lush variety and can be found in one form or another in
 
most composition classrooms. As Keesey says, "...the names
 
for the types or 'schools' of criticism are bewildering in
 
their number and diversity. We hear of moralists,
 
humanists, and esthetes, of historians, antihistorians,
 
Freudians and feminists, structuralists and deconstructions,
 
old New Critics and new Critics" (Contexts for Criticism 3).
 
Ironically, it seems that meaning encourages diverse
 
definitions and eludes the human effort to understand it.
 
Still, we try. Those who are interested in understanding
 
meaning and language have borrow ideas from science that
 
tell them that to classify is to know. And they have
 
classified theories about meaning in hundreds of ways. And
 
the problem becomes not whether these are valid theories and
 
categories: most certainly they are. Rather the problem is
 
what effect they have on the students writing under them.
 
How does the writing student cope with conflicts over
 
meaning? How do we justify the seemingly endless exercises
 
of revision if the writer must relinquish claim to meaning
 
once the words are put to paper, or once the words reach the
 
reader? Why study rhetoric? Why revise? Why write? Ways
 
of thinking about meaning that diminish the writer are
 
flawed for use in the composition classroom. For if writers
 
cannot produce and in some manner control meaning, on what
 
grounds do we ask them to write? And where is our remedy
 
for the need to be understood?
 
Studies in child development suggest that as infants we
 
are utterly self-centered and that as we mature we move
 
outward. I suggest that as writers we are never too far
 
from the self as center. Even though student writers are
 
taught to consider audience, they are taught to consider
 
them, not as individuals who may teach us something about
 
our own writing, but as subjects to be swayed. Successful
 
writers find ways to bring the audience into sympathy with
 
the writer's own views. The audience must be seen as
 
willing recipients of the writer's meaning in order to
 
achieve this objective, not as the creators of meaning.
 
Lindemann quotes the first position; from "Teaching
 
Composition: A Position Statement,"
 
Writing is a powerful instrument of thought. In
 
the act of composing writers learn about
 
theitiselves and their world and communicate their
 
insights to others. Writing confers the power to
 
grow personally and to effect change in the world
 
(226).
 
I believe this to be a reasonable view of writing and
 
one that is held by most students. After all, pieces of
 
writing have changed, and continue to change, the world.
 
But the key word in the above quotation is "their." Writers
 
learn about "their" world and communicate "their" insights.
 
Writers are first concerned with self as suggested again in
 
the second section of "Teaching Writing: A Position
 
Statement," which says that while composing, "the writer
 
uses language to help an audience understand something the
 
writer knows about the world" (226). Writers write in order
 
to be understood on their own terms. They are fundamentally
 
self-centered. Any concern with others is to further the
 
writer's own need. The writer's desire to have his or her
 
truths known by another is further noted in Rhetorical
 
Traditions and the Teaching of Writing when Knoblauch and
 
Brannon advise writing teachers that "they must begin with
 
what matters most to those [students] writers, namely, the
 
making of meaningful statements consistent with the writer's
 
own purposes..." (122). Writers wish to create a knowable
 
meaning-their own. This is the writer's reason for writing,
 
whether or not it is the result. And some beliefs about
 
meaning encourage this reason, while others do not.
 
Therefore, it is important to examine the theories
 
about meaning that are most likely to enter the Composition
 
classroom and that work either for or against the writer's
 
reason for writing.
 
Literary Criticism and Its Influence on Composition
 
One of the most accessible areas of research to the
 
composition teacher is literary criticism. Nearly all
 
composition teachers have studied the literary approaches to
 
meaning. Further, they have made judgments regarding their
 
worth and have designed discussions and assignments around
 
favored literary approaches. In this way, literary
 
assumptions about meaning move about the classroom as
 
silently as dust and are in turn inhaled by the students,
 
most of whom will not go on to study these theories for
 
themselves, but may come to value or devalue writing because
 
of them. Thus, the need to understand assiamptions about
 
meaning as they pertain to composition becomes apparent
 
since in some form or another, conscious or unconscious,
 
these theories about how to approach meaning help form the
 
foundation and define the structure of teaching composition.
 
Although literary criticism is not the only foundation from
 
which assumptions about meaning are drawn, literary based
 
assumptions are among the most prevalent. So, it is
 
essential to evaluate their influence on student writers.
 
I^^ looking at the role of literary criticism in the
 
composition classroom, it seems advisable to establish some
 
working terms. Donald Kessey has developed a useful system
 
of categories for literary criticism which deal with author,
 
work, audience, reality and literature (3). I would like to
 
borrow three of his terms to provide an overview of literary
 
criticism and its influence on student writers. Those terms
 
are Genetic Criticism, Formal Criticism, and Affective
 
Criticism (3) And simply defined, genetic criticism is
 
concerned with the writer, formal criticism is concerned
 
with the text, and affective criticism is concerned with the
 
reader. ^
 
Actually, with genetic criticism it is more precise to
 
say that the concern is with the writer's life, since the
 
writer is considered a product of his or her life
 
influences, and these influences are thought to be the cause
 
of the writing. Genetic criticism became the approach of
 
choice in most universities through the early part of the
 
twentieth century. This was a time of impressive strides in
 
science, and the literary community desperately needed to
 
prove itself against the empirical method. Genetic
 
criticism offered that chance. It provided literary
 
scholars with an objective and orderly scheme. In fact,
 
seeking to understand the rapid gain of genetic criticism's
 
favor by considering the mood of scholarly study at the time
 
is an example of its appeal.
 
Genetic criticism can be defined as the in-depth study
 
of a writer's life in order to find meaning in the writer's
 
work. Or, as M.H. Abrams says in "Orientation of Critical
 
Theories," "A work of art is essentially the internal made
 
external .embodying the combined product of the poet's
 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings" (17). And , in most
 
studies of genetic criticism, the cOinbined product includes
 
the poet's world. With varied emphasis, this approach
 
reaches beyond the writer's personal life into the
 
political, economic and religious environment under which
 
the writer lived and worked. Genetic criticism rests on a
 
foundation of determinate meaning. Here it shares in
 
Plato's search for "the" truth, though for the genetic
 
critic "the" truth or meaning is not found in the
 
remembrance of ideal forms but in the thorough examination
 
of the writer's life and times. Thus, given its belief in
 
determinate meaning, genetic criticism sets about its work
 
in a teachable way. The genetic critic studies the
 
historical context of the text and collects data on the
 
author. This knowledge is then applied to the text,
 
believing that these things influenced the text itself. As
 
Donald Keesey says in his introduction to Contexts for
 
Criticism, "...if a poem is the product of an author and the
 
author the product of an age, then nothing less than a full
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understanding of that age-the author's entire political,
 
social, and intellectual milieu-is required if we are to
 
fully understand that author's art" (11). It is a
 
Compelling argument, but often the writer's intent is
 
obscured by the details of his or her life and times.
 
Genetic/criticism:holds that readers must be equipped with
 
an historical context if they are to uncover textual
 
meaning, much the Same way that one searching for gold
 
should first have acquired a map.
 
However, one problem for this approach seems to be how
 
to limit the period to be studied. It seems only too easy
 
to move from studying the "entire political, social, and
 
intellectual milieu" of the author, to studying not only the
 
author's relationships to friends and enemies, parents and
 
children, but to children's friends and enemies and parent's
 
friends and enemies as well as spouse's and associate's. We
 
must study not only the political and social environment in
 
which the author wrote but the political and social
 
environment in which he or she grew up and in which his or
 
her parents grew up. If we say that we need a context,
 
beyond the words on the page, within which to understand
 
meaning, then we must also need a context within which to
 
understand our Context, ad infinitum.
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And still, with a great deal of information about the
 
writer's private and public life and all the elements that
 
surrounded it, how can we know in what way all this affected
 
the writer? As Donald Keesey reminds us, "There are writers
 
who had tortured relationships with their fathers and who
 
wrote haunting allegories about harsh and inscrutable
 
deities. Others had tortured relationships with their
 
fathers and wrote very different kinds of books(14).
 
So, since the one seeking the meaning to the text
 
cannot know just how the author's life and world affected
 
the author, except by the author's own words, which are held
 
suspect due to the conditions of his or her life, genetic
 
criticism becomes a circular search for meaning. And it is
 
a search aggravated by relativism, even though genetic
 
critics would argue for its objectivity. Whether the glass
 
was deemed half full or half empty by the rest of society
 
does not tell us how it was viewed by the writer. We must
 
trust the writer's writing for that.
 
Thus the problem in teaching composition from this
 
perspective is that genetic criticism, while it acknowledges
 
the writer, does not trust the writer's words. It reads the
 
words and then looks to the writer's environment to find
 
meaning, which suggests to student writers that they are not
 
the masters of meaning. Writers become victims of their
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surroundings and must write through the lens of their time.
 
While it is possible that this is true and that we are all
 
bound in this way, it is not motivation for grappling with
 
revision. And if it is true, what, then, do we do with
 
visionaries who create meaning beyond the bounds and
 
restraints of their own time and place? Student writers
 
need to sense the possibility of their own visionary promise
 
and to believe that there are ways of helping others to
 
"see."
 
There is, however, at least one positive condition that
 
can occur in a classroom where there is a foundation of
 
genetic criticism: the genetic critic does admit an intended
 
and perhaps knowable meaning and searches for that meaning.
 
Knowing that others put this much effort and thought into at
 
least trying to understand what the writer meant, translates
 
into someone working hard to find meaning in the student's
 
writing, which in turn excites the human need to be
 
understood. It says someone cares about the writer's idea
 
of meaning even though the writer's reality is subject to a
 
myriad of influences. It says to the student writer that
 
someone will try to know them, though it cannot offer any
 
guarantee that anyone will succeed. While genetic criticism
 
relegates the writer to a position somewhat less than his or
 
her surroundings, it nevertheless gives the writer some part
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in the puzzle of meaning. It does not deny that the writer
 
can still "impart" knowable information, a basis for
 
writing, but this is nonetheless outweighed by the problem
 
of attributing all information to influences beyond the
 
writer's control. This idea, whether accurate or not,
 
weakens the force that propels writing-our need to be
 
understood on our own terms and to believe that we are
 
individuals capable of original thought. Genetic criticism,
 
even with its apparent interest in the writer, still
 
challenges the writer's ability to control meaning and
 
thought. Perhaps writing experience or maturity renders
 
this challenge less effective, but in the beginning a writer
 
must believe in his or her own power over meaning.
 
Where genetic criticism challenges writers' control
 
over their own understanding of and reaction to the
 
circumstances of theii lives, formalism challenges the
 
writers' control over their own words. Formalism, as
 
defined by Donald Keesey, is the belief in "The status of
 
the poem [writing] as an 'object,' as something that exists
 
independently of its creator and independently of its
 
readers ..." (75). The student writer here may begin to
 
feel little more significant than her pen.
 
Fbrmalism suggests that the text is all, surviving in,
 
as M.H. Abrams has observed, ..."a world of its own.
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independent of the world into which we are born, whose end
 
is not to instruct or to please but simply to exist" (21).
 
Therefore, what came before the work and what follows the
 
work are inconsequential since the text is only a moment in
 
the writer's life, only a gathering of experiences that then
 
became an experience of its own. It is the offspring that
 
leaves the parent and though conceived by the parent is
 
still absolutely unique. Therefore, some would say, it is
 
not necessary to know the parent in order to know the child.
 
This idea is supported by the way a writer's work is said to
 
change even from the writer's own intent. As Donald Murray
 
says in his essay "Writing as Process: How Writing-Finds Its
 
Own Meaning," "At the end of the composing process there is
 
a piece of writing which has detached itself from the writer
 
and found its own meaning, a meaning the writer probably did
 
not intend" (3). This is a difficult piece of information
 
for the basic student writers who have worked through
 
various invention techniques in order to discover their own
 
intention, labored to employ correct rhetorical strategies
 
in order to present their intention, and revised many times
 
in order to protect their intention, only to arrive at a
 
meaning they "probably did not intend."
 
True, in the abstract one could argue that the
 
"unintended" meaning is really the purest form of the
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"intended meaning," but student writers may not enjoy this
 
detour through philosophy when they are having enough
 
trouble getting through composition. Yet, formalist
 
argument goes, the text is "an object of determinate meaning
 
existing apart from author or audience" (Kessey 77). Since
 
each moment in life forms a never repeated pattern, the
 
meaning of that moment can only exist in one singular stroke
 
of the pen. That moment, then, and meaning, is captured
 
only in text. It is sovereign and complete.
 
Formal critics, like genetic critics, also sought to
 
legitimize the study of literature by somehow objectifying .
 
it. But instead of gathering historical details concerning
 
the period in which the writer wrote, formal critics turned
 
to the text itself as the most objective of all, "...free
 
from the entangling difficulties and irrelevancies of author
 
and reader psychology" (Keesey 73). This approach divorced
 
itself from either cause (writer) or effect (reader) and
 
found itself replacing genetic criticism in universities by
 
the early 1950s.
 
This approach can be quite appealing for the
 
interpreters of a work. They need not spend time educating
 
themselves on the period in which the writer wrote or on the
 
writer's particular psychological make-up. They need only
 
have the work before them and the knowledge that somewhere
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within that work lies meaning. Formal critics advise
 
readers that "we can and should establish what the poem
 
[text] 'means' apart from what the author might have 'meant'
 
and that the public nature of language and our knowledge of
 
its norms and conventions guarantee the validity of this
 
distinction" (Keesey 77). In other words, you do not need
 
the carpenter after the shelves are built. The construct
 
defines its own use.
 
Ideas of meaning existing solely in the text itself and
 
having the ability to break free from the writer's
 
intention, as suggested by Murray, would be likely to work
 
against the student writer's efforts in several ways, but
 
mainly, to undermine the writer's control, which makes
 
revision a hard sell. Since composition theory places its
 
belief in writers' abilities to say what they mean, most
 
composition students are asked to revise not just at the
 
Sentence level, where most see some reason, but to the depth
 
of discovery. This means a major reconstructing effort, a
 
process Nicholas Coles calls, "so painstaking and time
 
consuming" (168). And what do we offer in return?
 
Referring again to Murray we offer, "a meaning the writeris]
 
probably did not intend" (3). We ask them to control the
 
uncontrollable. Perhaps after studying theory, working
 
through practice, and developing a crazed desire to
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understand the writing procdss/ many dediGated Writers are
 
able to reconcile revision with "unintehded" meaning, but
 
not basic student writers. As "Those
 
[students] whose teachers have Speci-ficalTy asked for
 
revision may have come to see the request as evidence that
 
the first draft was a mistake and as confirmation that
 
revision itself is a form of punishment" (167). To
 
effectively convince students of the value of revision, we
 
need to free it from the realm of the useless and the
 
punitive. While not impossible, selling ideas of revision
 
from a perspective of the basic principals of formal
 
criticism requires, at the least, a directed and careful
 
presentation./
 
For example, if we go back to the idea of a construct
 
defining its own use (we cannot use the shelves as a means
 
of transportation), then the idea of meaning being the
 
property and creation of text could be presented in a way
 
less devaluing to the writer. After all, it is the writer
 
who designs the construct, in this case-text. So, the
 
writer's intended meaning is afforded some protection. And
 
the more carefully the writer designs (uses rhetorical
 
strategy)-the less variation of use. This could allow a
 
usable connection between literary criticism and the
 
teaching of composition since it could be argued that formal
 
18
 
criticism is a complement to rhetorical strategy. The
 
writer works to create a text that as closely as possible
 
approximates his or her reality and passes that text into
 
the hands of the reader, who works to discover the meaning
 
of the text (which again if constructed properly should
 
limit the possible meanings to the intended one or nearly
 
so). Of course, "should" is the operative word, and how are
 
we to know?
 
Questions concerning Our ability to ever "know" meaning
 
in the same way as the writer intended are the doniain of the
 
affective critic. Affective critics doubt the value of
 
writer or text in the determination of meaning They share
 
the formalist position that the writer is irrelevant, then
 
move on to say that text is just a system of signs, with no
 
meaning beyond a community of interpreters who are in
 
agreement on the significance of the signs. Therefore, the
 
only place to consider meaning is in the reader's response
 
to the text. As Kessey describes it,...each reading is a
 
new creation and the poem that results is the creature of
 
whatever 'interpretive strategies' the reader has employed.
 
The poem 'in itself has quite disappeared" (137). And so,
 
too, the writer and the reason.
 
In fact, affective criticism, of all the forms of
 
literary criticism, may pose the greatest challenge to the
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basic student writer. Here the reader is the rhetorician
 
employing rhetorical strategies of his or her own for
 
purposes of interpretation and, at the end of this line of
 
reasoning, for creating a new meaning. It is the idea of a
 
"new" meaning that is most threatening to the writer's
 
reason for writing. It is an overwhelming dilemma to be
 
faced with not only the human need to be understood, but the
 
need to fulfill a writing assignment in which others are
 
helped to Understand when "The dverarching principle is:
 
identity re-creates itself, or, to put it another way,
 
style-in the sense of personal style-Creates itself. That
 
is, all of us, as we read, use the literary work to
 
symbolize and finally to replicate ourselves" (Holland 124).
 
Of course, other affective critics would say that we do more
 
than "replicate" ourselves as we read-we grow in our own
 
self-awareness. But neither reader self-replication nor
 
reader self-awareness was the goal of the writer. And this
 
forsaking of any effort to understand the writer's need and
 
intention would be nearly intolerable to the basic student
 
writer who must struggle through several revisions in an
 
effort to "reach" his or her audience, an audience whose
 
only concern is "re-creating" itself. In affective
 
criticism we have the problem of both the writer and the
 
reader working from a place of self.
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Interestingly, affective criticism rose in the 1960s,
 
corresponding with a period of rebellion and elevation of
 
the self over institutions. Absolutes in religion,
 
government, and even science were being looked at
 
suspiciously. It wasn't as popular (or necessary) to align
 
one's beliefs with the methods of science. So, in a time of
 
enhanced personal freedom, affective critics freed meaning
 
from the supportable "truth." In turn, they freed the
 
reader from the search and discovery inherent in genetic and
 
formal criticism. But they left the writer without cause.
 
Affective criticism moved along a steady course. At
 
first it sought meaning in the reader's response to the
 
text. When affective critics first moved from the text to
 
the reader, it seemed only a directional change, that is
 
meaning could be found at the end of the line of writer,
 
text, reader. But soon meaning moved even beyond the reader
 
and into the reader's community or system of beliefs,
 
creating a new problem for writers in their effort to make
 
"their" meaning known. In the essay "Is There a Text in
 
This Class?," Stanley Fish defines the move from reader to
 
interpretive community. Early in this essay Fish shares the
 
story of running into a colleague at Johns Hopkins
 
University. This colleague tells Fish about being
 
approached by a student who had just completed a course
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taught by Fish. Since apparently the student would then be
 
taking a course from Fish's colleague, she asked him, "Is
 
there 	a ■ t^xt ih this class?" (305) Fish then goes on to 
exp1ain how his col1eague hatura11y thought the studeht was
 
referring to a textbook,/when in realty she was questioning
 
a philosophy. Having taken a course in literary criticism
 
from Fish, the student's co^^^ "I mean in this dlass
 
do we 	believe in poems and things or is it just us"? (305).
 
Fish uses this illustration to defend affective criticism,
 
and further to define and expand the idea of the
 
interpretative community.
 
First, to defend affective criticism Fish addresses his
 
critics, namely, Meyer Abrams, by saying.
 
But the answer suggested by my little story is
 
that the utterance has 'two' literal meanings:
 
within the circiamstances assumed by my colleague
 
(I don't mean that he took the step of assuming
 
, them, but that he was already stepping within
 
^ :A 	them) the utterance is obviously a question about
 
whether or not there is a required textbook in
 
this particular course; but within the
 
circumstances to which he was alerted by his
 
student's corrective response, the utterance is
 
just as obviously a question about the
 
instructor's position (within the range of
 
positions available in contemporary literary
 
theory) on the status of the text. Notice that we
 
do not have here a case of indeterminacy and
 
undecidability but of determinacy and decidability
 
that do not always have the same shape and can and
 
in this instance do, change (306).
 
Fish is working here against the charge that under
 
affective criticism we have a world "in which 'no text can
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raean anything in particular' and where 'we can never say
 
just what anyone means by anything he writes'" (305). Fish 
is showing that language itself is not meaning, that given 
the norms of understanding language, we could not know what 
the utterance meant. He is saying that the utterance has 
meaning only within the experiences of the professor and the 
student and within their shared,institution. In other ' 
words, we cannot look at the mere words, "Is there a text in 
this Glass?" and discern the student's meaning. But, Fish 
would argue>? ;this does not itieah ■ tha:t we iausb arrive at any. 
wild and "willful" meaning we so choose. After all, the 
professor in the story did arrive at the appropriate 
meaning; he did not "impose" his own. This, Fish says, is 
the result of the "constraints" of "the understood practices 
and assumptions of the institution and not the rules and 
fixed meaning of a language system" (306). 
While it is evident that the words "Is there a text in
 
this class?" do lend themselves to more than one
 
interpretation, it seems more than reasonable to believe
 
that the appropriate interpretation was arrived at not by
 
the "constraints" of the "practices and assumptions of the
 
institution" but by the "student's corrective response." But
 
Fish discounts the student's role in bringing about the
 
correct interpretation. Fish states that "we do not have
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here a case of indeterminacy or undecidability" (306), but I
 
believe we could have had such a case without the student's
 
further explanation. And if we replace the student and the
 
professor with the writer and the reader, we have a
 
excellent argument for asking writers to revise and for
 
asking readers to abandon, at least temporarily, their
 
preconceptions since without the writer's "corrective"
 
measures we could have an "imposed" and "willful" meaning.
 
But, again, comes the troublesome issue of the
 
difference between the validity of asking the reader to
 
abandon his or her preconceptions and the actual ability to
 
do so. As Fish goes on in his essay, he explains the idea
 
of the interpretive "situation." In this explanation he both
 
expands the idea of interpretive communities and opens the
 
door for a notable attack on this type of idea. But most of
 
all he suggests that the reader cannot escape the
 
interpretive community, the "world of already-in-place
 
objects, purposes, goals, procedures, values, and so on"
 
(304).
 
This idea contains so much that works against the
 
writer's reason for writing that it deserves close
 
consideration lest it undermine the teaching of composition.
 
First, the idea of meaning being dependent on the
 
interpretive community severely diminishes the writer. In
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 the same way thht>lith:iV ere in Fish's
 
illustration to the student for averting misunderstanding,
 
so too,: under reader response criticism, little (or ho)^ '
 
credit is given to the writer. Fish claims that t^^^
 
■ptofeshor 	ffi from assuming that the student was ;inguirihg 
about a textbook to the understanding that she was inquiring 
about a philosophic perspective because ''he must 
thinking within those circumstances" (313) Further, Fish 
states that the professor was able to do this because "...it 
was already part of his repertoire for organizing the world 
and Its events" (31^ / .this same way. Fish Suggests that 
some people "get" his story of the student immediately while 
others do not. Those who "get" it are those who ". ..come to 
hear me [Fish] speak because they are the; people who already 
know my position on certain matters'' (312) v Therefore, they 
came not to be challenged or changed--but to be confirmed. 
This is.what many affeetive ctttics say. happens when-^ 
read. ■ ' ' : -V, t 
But, if this is so, how did those people come to know 
Fish's position in the first plaCe?:^^^^^ n^^^ they all. arrive at 
the conclusion simultaneously while Fish simply articulated 
it? Is this method of making meaning (interpretive ■ 
communities) one of those "already-in-place objects"? If 
so, why didn't everyone "get" it? Because the idea of 
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interpretive communities was not "already-in-place" even
 
within its own interpretive community. It was a unique
 
branch that had been cultivated from a certain variety of
 
thought. And it needed its originator to use his best
 
rhetorical strategy to explain its uniqueness. Certainly,
 
it was most easily explained to those who had previous
 
knowledge of its genesis, but even they had to make
 
adjustments in their schemes (or ways of knowing) to
 
accommodate and finally accept it. Given careful enough
 
construction of explanation and argument, even a person with
 
no prior knowledge of literary theory, (from outside the
 
interpretive community) could come to understand the idea of
 
such a community, thereby suggesting that it is the writer's
 
methods that "constrain" meaning-not the interpretive
 
community.
 
So, unless we believe that writers do not care what
 
shape their thoughts are made to take, we must be careful
 
with ideas of affective criticism. It is, at least,
 
discouraging to the student writer. We cannot ask student
 
writers to revise if we believe that they could not possibly
 
end up saying what they "mean." We cannot ask them to revise
 
while stealing their vision or sealing them in the vacuum of
 
"conceptual scheme." We cannot ask them to revise if we
 
believe they hand their efforts over to an all powerful.
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self-centered reader, who plunders with impunity. We can
 
only ask them to revise because revision works. And
 
revision only works if it produces the intended meaning and
 
lets writers share who they are and what they believe with
 
other human beings who are willing to go and "know" beyond
 
themselves.
 
Many will argue that this is a severely limited
 
overview of literary criticism and does not do justice to
 
its theories. I agree. But this is just'what most students
 
writers get. They are not students of literary criticism.
 
They come into contact with it as students from many
 
disciplines needing to get through required writing courses,
 
and literary criticism comes at them in pieces and slogans
 
and partial premises. On the surface, at least, it seldom
 
supports the writer which can make it a'hostile presence in
 
the composition classroom.
 
Writers write to be understood, to be exposed. That is
 
what makes writing frightening. That is what makes it
 
irresistible. Like the moth to the flam©/ writers are drawn
 
to the light of self-expression. When the writer writes to
 
the audience, it is with the faith that audiences read first
 
to understand what is before them. As writers we expect a
 
certain integrity from readers. We expect that in as much
 
as possible they will try to move beyond who they are and
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into who we are. We expeGt them to become partners in our
 
self-expression. Perhaps that is selfish and naive.
 
Perhaps given ideas of conceptual scheme and interpretive
 
communities that is impossible. Nevertheless, honor demands
 
■■ . ■■'it. ■ 
And if there is to be honor in the writer/reader
 
relationship then we must be careful with literary
 
criticism, and in particular. We must be careful with ideas
 
that the reader is a hapless victim tossed about within the
 
safe confi^ss of his or her own scheme. In the same way
 
that believing the writer canndt escape a predictability of
 
thought based on the consequences of time and place can
 
destroy a writer's motivation, so, too, believing that the
 
reader cannot escape those Confines destroys the motivation
 
of each.
 
On the whole, whether it encourages or discourages,
 
literary criticism, in its many forms, does affect the
 
student writer. The effect may be a function of form, as
 
appears in the case of how affective criticism seems to work
 
more against the student writer than does formal or genetic
 
criticism, or it may be a function of presentation. Even
 
affective criticism could be shown in a somewhat favorable
 
relationship to the writer's purpose in that readers and
 
writers share in the activity of attempting to know the
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s6lf and tnat knowirtg the self inay not preclude knowing and
 
understanding others, Thtis it becomes important for the r
 
writing instructor to know the self also/ so that choices in
 
form and preseritation can be made fo giv:e student writers a
 
reason to write and to keep writing through revision. But
 
irtore important the instructor heeds to atay open to ideas ef
 
meaning nnd how fhey wbrk in tbe Gompositioh classroom. The
 
instructor needs to believe in the possibility of meahing
 
and the methods for sharing personal meaning with others. : .
 
As M.H. Abrams reminds us.
 
The paramount cause of poetry is not, as in
 
. Aristotle, a formal cause, determined primarily by
 
the human actions and qualities imitated; nor, as
 
in neoclassic criticism a final cause, the effect
 
intended upon the audience; but instead an
 
efficient cause—the impulse within the poet of
 
feelings and desires seeking expression...(17).
 
Of all the choices given to the world when it
 
encounters a piece of writing, one should be that the
 
writing represents just what the writer hoped it would, and
 
conveys exactly that to the reader. With all its
 
variations, literary criticism still does not offer that
 
choice. And yet literary criticism does have influence in
 
the composition classroom. Perhaps the choice that writers
 
can impart their meaning to others is idealistic, but there
 
are theories that suggest it is possible, and if not
 
possible why do we bother to ask "Do you know what I mean?"
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CHAPTER III
 
"Passing Theory" and Composition
 
Of course, teachers of composition do not rely sblely
 
on the theories of literary criticism as a basis for
 
composition,instruction. Recent research in composition has
 
offered new directions for composition instructors, but
 
these directions center mainly in methods and assignments.
 
With new understanding of how writers do what they do, the
 
rush is naturally toward application. When writing
 
instructors think about meaning, they are usually still
 
drawing from sources established and defined by literary
 
criticism. And, as shown in the previous chapter, defining
 
meaning under the terms of literary criticism can create a
 
conflict of interests. On the one hand, are the: choices;
 
that meaning lies either in the circumstances of the , ; -

WtiterVs life, pf^ apart from the writer altogether,
 
or is made by the reader. On the other hand, is the need to
 
convince student writers that it is they who make meaning.
 
This battle over the nature of meaning has long been
 
and will probably always be. If we take a pragmatic
 
approach, it may not need to be resolved in order to
 
instruct writing students from a place of conviction
 
regarding the students' control of meaning. We simply need
 
to acknowledge that ways of writing, such as rhetorical
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strategy, can help the writer create a piece of writing that
 
can be understood by a reader. And, furthermore,
 
composition instructors need to acknowledge that even though
 
writing itself is recursive it does not simply lead readers
 
back to their old ideas; in composition^ an old form is used
 
to create a new form. Instead of entering a process and
 
undergoing complete disintegration only to return to our
 
former construction, we emerge from the writing process, to
 
varying degrees, changed. We emerge from the process with
 
new possibilities of thought. We emerge from the process
 
already through the entrance to further exploration.
 
The recursiveness of the writing process, the way that
 
a writer looks backward into his or her writing to chart the
 
next forward movement, leaves the writer strangely connected
 
to endings and beginnings. While in composition the
 
smallest addition or deletion can make an idea suddenly
 
unique - separate from its past yet ready to assist in the
 
creation of its future - recursiveness nevertheless leaves
 
the writer in flux, fully separate from neither past nor
 
future. The writer is still looking back, waiting for the
 
old to become new again.
 
As Sondra Perl states in her essay "Understanding
 
Composing,
 
We have advocated the idea that writing is a
 
recursive process, that throughout the process of
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writing, writers return to substrands of the
 
Qverall process, or subroutines (short successions
 
of steps that yield results on which the writer
 
draws in taking the next set of steps); writers
 
use these to keep the process moving forward"
 
(115).
 
Perl goes on to list three elements of recursiveness as
 
follows:
 
1. The most visible recurring feature or backward
 
movement involves rereading little bits of
 
discourse. Few writers I have seen write for long
 
periods of time without returning briefly to what
 
is already down on the page...
 
2. The second recurring feature is some key word
 
or item called up by the topic. Writers
 
consistently return to their notion of the topic
 
throughout the process of writing. Particularly
 
when they are stuck, writers seem to use the topic
 
or a key word in it as a way to get going again.
 
Thus many times it is possible to see writers
 
'going back', rereading the topic they were given,
 
changing it to suit what they have been writing or
 
changing what they have written to suit their
 
notion of the topic.
 
3. There is also a third backward movement in
 
writing, one that is not so easy to document. It
 
is not easy because the move, itself, cannot
 
immediately be identified with words. In fact,
 
the move is not to any words on the page nor to
 
the topic but to feelings or non-verbalized
 
perceptions that surround the words, or to what
 
the words already present evoke in the writer.
 
The move draws on sense experience, and it can be
 
observed if one pays close attention to what
 
happens when writers pause and seem to listen or
 
otherwise react to what is inside of them. The
 
move occurs inside the writer, to what is
 
physically felt...(115)
 
If we accept the idea of the recursive nature of
 
writing (and I am unaware of any opposition to it since it
 
is an observable and recordable phenomena), then the
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shortcomings of literary criticism, particularly affective
 
varieties, for use in the composition classroom become even
 
clearer. None of the literary theories so far studied
 
allows for this type of movement since they are linear.
 
The literary critic seeks to place meaning at a specific
 
point along the line of writer^text-reader (or beyond).
 
While there may be some recursiveness within each point,
 
each point remains, nonetheless, separate. Placing meaning
 
in this type of isolation may serve the literary critic
 
well, but, again/ it does not serve the writing student.
 
One of the main objectives of teaching composition is
 
to help a writer to make his or her thoughts and feelings
 
Understandable to another. And, in part, this objective
 
relies on recursiveness which, of course, does not work with
 
points along a line. Recursiveness in composing builds from
 
reading the previous sentence in order to create the next
 
sentence to searching through the, previous idea in order to
 
create the next idea.
 
To further illustrate the scope of recursiveness in
 
writing let us consider the following explanation of the
 
writing process from a beginning level writing text.
 
Contexts. The authors identify threevstages of writing:
 
preparation, reading/writing, and review. Though the names
 
Of these stages change from text to text (another common
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version being pre-writing, writing, and revision), the 
stages themselves represent the currently agreed upon 
beliefs regarding the general stages of the process of 
writing. But they are not seen as necessarily coming in 
that order, or as stages to be completed before moving on to 
the next. The function of the stages, as they are used by 
writers, is fluid. Or as also described in Contexts, ■ 
"Writers and readers may therefore move back and forth 
between the stages, proceeding to one before completing 
another or returning to an earlier one before moving forward 
again. Or they may engage in two stages at the same 
time"(3). 
Therefore, we can establish an important distinction
 
between literary theory and composition theory. The
 
literary critic places meaning at a fixed point, but the
 
composition theorist works recursively, placing meaning in
 
overlapping junctions. It follows, then, that the
 
assumptions found in literary criticism, no matter how
 
carefully presented, are not naturally compatible with what
 
is known about how (and why) writers compose. What, then,
 
shall we tell student writers about meaning? Again, it must
 
be admitted that literary criticism offers compelling and
 
generally accepted arguments about meaning, and that it is
 
present in the basic assumptions of composition teachers.
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But what must also be present is the belief that purposeful 
and effective composition can be taught, composition, here, 
meaning both a set- (rhetoric) and body of 
knowledge, together presenting workable solutions for 
composition students regarding meaning. ■ 
The body of knowledge in composition is supported by
 
studies of how writers write. Because of the work of Flower
 
Hayes, Janet Emig, Donald Murray and countIpss others who
 
broke ground by moving composition from practitioner,
 
experiences to supportable research, teachers can tell
 
students what is known about the process of writing. They
 
can assure students that while it seems chaotic to wander
 
back and forth within the sentences, ideas, and stages of
 
process, for many writers this is the way it is done.
 
Further, they can show students how this seeming chaos
 
leads to meaning. But as teachers they must believe all
 
this is true. With this belief, teachers can more
 
effectively teach students rhetorical and editing skills.
 
They can tell them that these skills enhance, clarify, and
 
protect meaning. But they must believe this too. In order
 
to be a workable theory in the composition classroom, the
 
theory must accommodate recursiveness and treat meaning as
 
something obtainable by teachable/learnable methods. If the
 
theory embraces these two tenets, the instructor does not
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risk the conflict of interest that can occur when
 
composition instruction attempts to build on a foundation of
 
critical literary theory. Since literary theory cannot in
 
its present stage of development be made to fit the needs of
 
the beginning writing student, we should look at other
 
related theories; one elegantly compatible theory comes to
 
composition from the philosophy and language studies of
 
Donald Davidson.
 
Davidson's work includes ^'passing theory," a theory
 
that appears to be in direct agreement with composition
 
theory. But before looking at how "passing theory" can be
 
applied to composition, it is important to note that
 
Davidson's work does not deny the various theories of
 
literary criticism; it greatly expands them. It gives
 
interpreters (or readers) credit to accept new truths as
 
they become evident:
 
We get a new out of an old scheme when the
 
speakers of a language come to accept as true an
 
important range of sentences they previously took
 
to be false (and, of course, vice versa). We must
 
not describe this change simply as a matter of
 
their coming to view old falsehoods as truths...
 
A change has come to the meaning of the sentence
 
because it now belongs to a new language ("On the
 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" 188).
 
For the purposes of composition, we could say that this
 
"new language" came by way of the writer. Further, we could
 
say that the writer was able to accomplish this through
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careful construction of the writing. "Coming to view old
 
falsehoods as truths" or conversely coming to view old
 
truths as falsehoods is within the domain of both writer and
 
reader.
 
For the writer, believing that old falsehoods can
 
become new truths or that old truths can become new
 
falsehoods affirms the process of writing. This possibility
 
is a remedy for the need to be understood. This makes
 
understanding achievable and, therefore, worth striving to
 
impart and obtain. One of the considerations in teaching
 
writing is that in addition to the reader coming to
 
understand something not previously understood, the writer,
 
too, might come to a new understanding. But both of these
 
possibilities are lost if we accept certain elements of
 
literary criticism, for example, if we accept that we are
 
all (both writer and reader) bound to our own conceptual
 
scheme as seen in both affective and genetic criticism, or
 
if we accept that even the writer cannot really understand
 
the words after they leave his or her mind as seen in
 
formalism.
 
But Davidson offers a reasonable alternative, one that
 
does not leave either writer or reader trapped in a closed
 
system, one that allows a free exchange of energy and
 
thought. Davidson begins with many of the notions common in
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literary criticism, but in keeping with his theories, he
 
does not end there. "Passing theory" allows Davidson three
 
overlapping points from which to enter into interpretation.
 
And while Davidson, too, struggles with ideas of meaning, he
 
suggests that the elusive nature of meaning does not deny
 
the possibility of it. And neither do questions of meaning
 
deny the possibility of interpretation.
 
Included in Davidson's philosophies about meaning is an
 
interesting explanation of how interpretation is
 
accomplished. Though Davidson is mainly discussing
 
interpretation of speech, his work applies nicely to
 
interpretation of the written word. Davidson offers an
 
extremely reasonable account of what goes on between speaker
 
and hearer. He believes that speaker and hearer (and I
 
believe in much the same way, writer and reader) come
 
together at a certain point in time with all their prior
 
theories about language and truth and how to use language to
 
understand and be understood. "The speaker wants to be
 
understood, so he utters words he believes can and will be
 
interpreted in a certain way. In order to judge how he will
 
be interpreted, he forms, or uses, a picture of the
 
interpreter's readiness to interpret along certain lines" (A
 
Nice Derangement of Epitaphs 443).
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By this statement, Davidson suggests a spirit of
 
cooperation between speaker and hearer (writer and reader).
 
Davidson believes that while the Speaker and interpreter do
 
not encounter each other with exactly the same prior
 
theories, having different prior theories does not eliminate
 
the possibility of understanding as it does in Fish's
 
explanation of reader response theory. This is the point of
 
divergence between Fish and Davidson and between literary
 
criticism and composition theory. The difference is not in
 
the belief in either prior theory or conceptual scheme, but
 
in the implications of such. What does it itiean that readers
 
and writers come from various backgrounds and accepted
 
truths? For Fish it iiteans there can be no way of knowing
 
the truth of another. For Davidson it simply means that the
 
reader and writer come from different backgrounds and
 
accepted truths. For Fish it is the end. For Davidson it
 
is the beginning.
 
As Davidson explains, "In any case, my point is this:
 
most of the time prior theories will not be shared, and
 
there is no reason why they should be. Certainly, it is not
 
a condition of successful communication that prior theories
 
be shared..." (A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs 443). So,
 
even though every individual comes from a unique background
 
and this unique background has led the individual to develop
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personal strategies for understanding (conceptual scheme),
 
this does not mean that the interpreter can never know the
 
words of the speaker in the way that,the speaker knows them.
 
Applying Davidson's theories, it seems the very
 
pronouncement that knowing the truth of another is
 
impossible is confirmation that it possible. For the
 
only way that we could know that our truth is different from
 
another's truth is to understand the truth of another.
 
And applied to writing, it seems reasonable that the
 
reader, working from his or her Own conceptual scheme, can
 
also come to know the words of the writer in the same way
 
the writer knows them, which would fulfill the very purpose
 
of writing. This is not to say that this will happen every
 
time a reader encounters a piece of writing, only that this
 
type of coming to terms with a writer's meaning is available
 
to the reader. And beginhing writers in particular need to
 
know this.
 
Next, in Davidson's work on meaning, comes the theory
 
that makes understanding possible. This is the theory
 
Davidson calls "passing theory:"
 
I have distinguished what I have been calling the
 
prior theory from what I shall henceforth call the
 
passing theory. For the hearer, the prior theory
 
expresses how he is prepared in advance to
 
interpret ah utterance of the speaker, while the
 
passing theory is how he does interpret the
 
utterance (442).
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Further, Davidson stresses that passing theory is "...
 
where, accident aside, agreement is greatest." If we take
 
passing theory into the writer/reader experience, we could
 
say that the reader enters the text with prior theory, but
 
upon reading the writer's words, the reader must adapt prior
 
theory to accommodate any part of the writer's words or
 
meanings that do not fit into the prior understanding. This
 
accommodation does not necessarily mean an instant meeting
 
of the minds between writer and reader, but it does mean a
 
change in the reader's prior theory with each development of
 
passing theory. This is essential to anyone ever coming to
 
understand concepts new to them; and the progress of the
 
human race is evidence that we can come to new
 
understandings, proving that we are not prisoners to our
 
conceptual schemes either personally or collectively.
 
To take our understanding of the implications of
 
Davidson's theories on writing even further, we can turn to
 
an article by Reed Dasenbrock in College English called, "Do
 
We Write the Text We Read?" Dasenbrock uses Davidson's work
 
to support; the study of literature, since the study of
 
literature itself would become rather moot under a system of
 
conceptual relativism. Why study a piece of writing if the
 
only possible conclusion to be drawn is the one the
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interpreter held to begin with? Dasenbrock quotes Jonathan
 
Culler as Saying, "A reader who preates /everything learns
 
nothing'' (As in Dasehbrock 14) ^ ^d Dasenbrock th^
 
to say himself that, "Interpretations are not always self-

confirming; interpreters do not always produce
 
interpretations utterly consistent with their prior beliefs
 
and theories; theories are sometimes adjusted to fit
 
experience rather than vice versa" (14). This is sound
 
reasoning in support of the study of rhetorical strategy and
 
in the practice of revision; it would serve no purpose to
 
select correct rhetorical strategy and revise to clarify
 
meaning if the reader is not able to adjust his or her
 
theories to accommodate all this effort on the writer's
 
Other of Dasenbrock's arguments in support of literary
 
studies work equally well in support of current composition
 
theory. Dasenbrock provides an illustration of a classroom
 
where the students enter "with an unconscious but tenacious
 
prior theory that works of literature can teach us about
 
life" (15). Only in this classroom the instructor enters
 
with a theory based in affective criticism, that (in
 
essence) nothing means anything, since we are "doomed...to
 
write the text we read according to our own beliefs and
 
values" (15). Here are two conflicting "prior theories"
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regarding the study Of iiterature, but Dassenbrdck continues
 
to develop his point by discussing the students' reaction to 
the novel The Age of Innocence♦ As the students encounter 
the end of the novel, they are cha11enged by an ending that 
moves outside of the predictable. In other words, it is not 
what the students believe they themselves would have done in 
that situation, nor is it what they would have liked for the 
characters to do. The action of the characters is beyond 
the students' past experience. Therefore, part of the 
students' "prior theory" cannot accommodate this new 
experience. But the students also held a "prior theory" 
that "literature can teach us about life." So, here the 
students must either adopt a new theory to account for the 
ending of Wharton's novel or they must abandon the old 
theory that literature teaches them about life. Either way 
they cannot simply return to the old conceptual scheme. 
The Age of Innocence ended as it ended. , It did not end 
as expected. The thing has happened and must now be dealt 
with. Dasenbrock shows how this can be done using "passing 
theory." Since "passing theory" is a place to begin, 
students start to ask questions regarding the novel, its 
ending, and its author. Dasenbrock states that the, 
.students encounter someone who shares much of their beliefs 
(about, for example, the importance of love)" (16), but this 
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same someone then acts in a way contrary to those beliefs.
 
Through reflection and discussion and questioning, the
 
students then adjust prior theory to allow for the action
 
taken by the character in The Age of Innocence. This can be
 
done whether or not the student accepts that the action was
 
correct. The students may in fact disagree with the action,
 
but the fact that someone might see the action differently,
 
or that this action is indeed a possibility, has been
 
incorporated into the students' prior theory. Dasenbrock
 
sums it up quite well:
 
In short, to interpret another's utterance we
 
begin by assuming provisional agreement on what we
 
believe to be true. But that provisional,
 
heuristic step is necessary only because as we
 
actually interprets we encounter anomalies,
 
sentences that don't seem to agree with what we
 
hold true. Our immediate reaction when we
 
encounter difference is to refuse that difference,
 
to preserve the maximum of agreement, and there
 
are times when this works, when we get away with
 
assuming that we are saying the same thing if by
 
different words. But the interesting moments are
 
when this doesn't work so well, when we realize
 
that what we are interpreting does express beliefs
 
different from our own (16).
 
DaSenbrock does not return to the instructor of the
 
class that he used as an example. But it would seem an easy
 
step from Dasenbrock's discussion of how the students
 
responded to building a case on how all this affected the
 
instructor who held that we are "doomed ... to write the
 
text we read according to our own beliefs and values" (15).
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The instructor held this belief as his prior theory upon
 
entering the classroom. She, like the students, was then in
 
the position of encountering something that did not fit her
 
prior theory or her conceptual scheme. Based on her prior
 
theory she would need to either discount the entire
 
experience of the students and convince herself that in
 
realty they had ieapnedhothing or to abandon her prior
 
theory. If she chooses the first, then there is no purpose
 
to her profession. If she chooses the second, then she
 
admits the possibility that the reader does more than
 
"write" the text. She admits the possibility that the
 
reader comes to understand the text in not previously
 
understood terms, that instead of the: reader defining the
 
text by his or her reading of it, the reader was able to
 
redefine his or her own understanding. Therefore, it seems
 
possible to suggest that the writer was able to impart his
 
or her own "meaning" to the reader.
 
That the reader then accepts the new understanding as
 
correct or appropriate remains another matter. What is
 
important to beginning writers, and those who teach them, is
 
that imparting a writer's own meaning is possible. With
 
this the writing instructor ca.n effectively teach what is
 
known about writing. The writing instructor can share the
 
tools of rhetorical strategy and the methods of process.
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The instructor can convincingly stress the benefits of
 
revision and editing. This can be done because of the
 
assumption that meaning exists and is translatable. And
 
this assumption is quite compatible with Davidson's passing
 
theory." In fact, if considered side by side, "passing
 
theory" and composition theory create an interestingly
 
similar pattern.
 
First, composition students are instructed to consider
 
their audience and to select from the available writing
 
styles the one most likely to "move" that particular
 
audience. Or as Erika Lindemann has said in A Rhetoric for
 
Writing Teachers, "When we practice rhetoric, we use
 
language, either spoken or written, to 'induce cooperation'
 
in an audience" (36). Clearly, the belief here is that
 
writers are writing to malleable readers. And Davidson's
 
"passing theory" of interpretation works with the same kind
 
of belief. Passing theory, again, holds that the
 
reader/interpreter enters into interpretation with a full
 
set of prior beliefs and experiences, but that the reader
 
(interpreter) is not limited by these beliefs and
 
experiences; rather, the beliefs and experiences of the
 
reader/interpreter fill only one space within the mind.
 
There are other spaces. And it is within these other spaces
 
that new truths are born. It is also within these other
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spaces that writers can "induce cooperation." For a
 
composition instructor to be effective, he or she must
 
believe in these other spaces. For the composition
 
instructor steeped too strongly in literary theory,
 
especially reader response, it is difficult to believe in
 
these other spaces.
 
Composition instructors also discuss the ways in which
 
rhetorical and grammatical choices can protect the student's
 
meaning. This, of course, assumes that meaning exists.
 
Davidson also assumes that meaning exists, although for
 
Davidson the concept of meaning is the product of the
 
translation of sentences or the "truth" of the sentence.
 
"Having identified his utterance as intentional and
 
linguistic, we are able to go on to interpret his words, we
 
can say what his words, on that occasion, meant" ("Radical
 
Interpretation" 125). Much of Davidson's effort is directed
 
at designing theories of how we are able to understand the
 
utterances of another, to grasp their meaning. In his essay
 
"Belief and the Basis of Meaning" Davidson states that
 
"Theories of belief and meaning may require no exotic
 
objects, but they do use concepts which set such theories
 
apart from the physical and other non-psychological
 
sciences..."(154). in order to advance theories on meaning
 
it is necessary to accept the existence of meaning. And so.
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too, the act of creating meaning within oufselves and
 
capturing it in writing for others requires an acceptance of
 
meaning's existence.
 
In addition to discussions of audience, rhetoric, and
 
grammar, the concept and act of recursiveness is explained
 
in the composition class. Here the instructor might share
 
studies where writers have recorded on tape their thoughts
 
and actions during an actual writing exercise. With this it
 
can be seen how real writers go back and forth, searching
 
the prior ideas and sentences for the elements and impetus
 
of the next set of ideas and sentences, moving back to gain
 
the thrust to move forward. The students might be told that
 
some people do this with every sentence while Others move
 
back at certain points of idea development, and still others
 
move back at s6me private signal when for some unknown
 
reason the flow of words simply stops. This recursiveness
 
is often drawn out for students on the board as a series of
 
overlapping lines. Interestingly, Dasenbrock's account of
 
Davidson's theories can be shown by the same pattern of
 
overlapping lines (see illustration pg. 50). Going back for
 
a moment to Perl's list of the elements of recursiveness, it
 
can be seen how these elements are present in Davidson's
 
theory. First, Perl states that "Few writers...write for
 
long...without returning briefly to what is already down on
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the page. (115). Second, writers return to "their notion
 
of the topic" (115). And third, writers go back and "seem
 
to listen...to what is inside of them" (115). This compares
 
well to Davidson's "prior theory," passing theory" and "new
 
prior theory." (See illustration on following page.)
 
Clearly, the elements of recursiveness described by
 
Perl and the ways of "passing theory" described by Davidson
 
have strong parallels. Perl explains how writers go back
 
and draw against existing knowledge to create new knowledge,
 
and Davidson's explains how interpreters go back to prior
 
theories to create new theories. Davidson's work on
 
"passing theory" allows the compbsition instructor to
 
believe in a transferable meaning.
 
Beliefs guide our choices in life, and beliefs about
 
composition guide our choices in teaching. Choices in
 
teaching come in the form of methods, priorities and
 
assignments, all based on assumptions about meaning.
 
Methods are the ways instructors present their beliefs about
 
their subject. In Eight Approaches to Teaching Composition,
 
Timothy R. Donovan and Ben W, McClelland explain eight
 
methods of teaching, all based on a belief in writing as a
 
process. Donovan and McClelland assert that the teaching of
 
composition has broken away from traditional instruction in
 
much the same way that a scientific theory breaks away from
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previous theories. In other words, once it was proven that
 
the world was not flat, there was no longer any need to
 
address questicins dealing with at what point one would fall
 
off. And now that we understand that writing is more than
 
form, that we do little if we teach a student where to place
 
commas but not how to access ideas, we no Idnger need to
 
address questions of the best way to achieve correctness.
 
The questions haye changed and with them our beliefs have
 
changed. So, too, the methods of instruction have changed,
 
requiring that we hold our methods up to our assumptions and
 
test the fiti
 
Eight Approaches to Teaching Composition further
 
identifies the most widely used current methods as "The
 
Prose Model Approach," "The Experiential Approach," "The
 
Rhetorical Approach," "The Epistimic Approach," "Basic
 
Writing," "The Writing Conference," and "Writing in the
 
Total Curriculum." Each of these approaches represents an
 
overriding belief in the writing process, but as has been
 
discussed, under that belief still lurk many seeds of
 
literary criticism. And now that composition has a growing
 
body of research, research that is defined by writers and
 
the ways of writing and not by the finished product, the
 
seeds of literary criticism can be left to grow in their own
 
51
 
field;and not formed into hybrid versions in support of the
 
teaching of composition.
 
Each of the methods of writing instruction described in
 
Eight Approaches to Teachihg Composition relies in its own
 
way on three characteristics. The first of these
 
characteristics is the existence of meaning. And for this,
 
writing instructors are not necessarily bound to understand
 
the nature of that existence. They take it on faith. For
 
without meaning, they have no cause to ask writers to write.
 
The second characteristic is that there are ways of
 
improving a writer's chances to impart meaning. Third is
 
that there is an audience that is capable of translating the
 
writing. And here translating means not just understanding
 
the words but also having a willingness and capacity on the
 
part of the reader to look beyond the reader's own sense of
 
the words.
 
These are the ways of teach writing and the conditions
 
that those ways rest upon. But searching out theories to
 
support those ways and meet those conditions is not an
 
attempt to validate the writing instruction. It is an
 
attempt to unify the instruction with the beliefs that
 
govern it. It is not an attempt to discount the theories of
 
other disciplines; it is an attempt to examine and adopt
 
those that work most closely with what is known about
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composition. Searching out theories is the act of reaching
 
back to what already exists in order to create something
 
new. And it is being pragmatic enough to accept what works
 
best in a given situation. For composition instructors that
 
given situation is the composition classroom. In that
 
classroom, thinking in terms of "passing theory" could yield
 
effective teaching of composition.
 
There is a uniqueness in the teaching of composition
 
and a madness in the relationship of the writer and the
 
writing. The uniqueness is in the on-going nature of
 
writing. Many writing instructors tell their students that
 
the writing is never really finished. And this is true.
 
This unfinishedness is what creates the madness of the
 
relationship. Since the writer is changing with every word
 
he or she writes, it is important to understand that this is
 
natural, that this is both the way and the reason we create.
 
Students can become easily disenchanted with this lack
 
of closure unless it has purpose, which the belief in
 
meaning provides. Again, in the first position of "Teaching
 
Composition: A Position Statement" we are told that
 
"...writers learn about themselves and their world and
 
communicate their insights to others" (226). But the belief
 
in the ability to "communicate" insights to others is
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constantly challenged by many of the theories of literary
 
criticism.
 
For purposes of teaching composition it may be wise to
 
simply accept that writing is teachable, that writing can
 
impart the writer's intended meaning to others and that
 
readers read to understand the meaning of another not just
 
to forge thatmeaning into the reader's own scheme.
 
Certainly, all these ideas are supportable. They are
 
supported by composition research that tells us that writing
 
is a recursive process that challenges writers to understand
 
themselves and teaches them the art of sharing that
 
understanding with others. It presupposes that such an
 
exchange is possible. They are supported by the studies of
 
Donald Davidson in his work on the translatability of
 
language and"passing theory" which elegantly argues that
 
unless we accept that there are ways of knowing what another
 
means, we can "make sense neither of our own beliefs or the
 
beliefs of another" (Dasenbrock 10). And they are supported
 
by readers who have had the experience of breaking from
 
their old theories in an elegant moment of new
 
understanding.
 
In one quiet, glorious moment we understood. And we
 
remain eternally grateful to the writer who worked to make
 
that moment possible-the moment when we said, "Yes, I know
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what you mean." This is the experience and the hope that
 
composition instructors can pass on to their students, not
 
the belief that it will happen every time to everyone, but
 
that that moment is possible.
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